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WORKERS' COMPENSATION - Carrier's Intentional Tort Is Not
Controlled by Exclusive Remedy Provision - Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 55
(Miss. 1984)
FACTS
Clara J. Holland was employed by K & B Slaughter House as
a meat wrapper. In the course of her employment, Ms. Holland
injured her back and as a result underwent back surgery.'
The employer's Workmen's Compensation insurance carrier paid
her medical bills and temporary total benefits for approximately
a year and one-half and then, based on medical advice, terminated
those benefits. Twenty-six months later the Mississippi Workmen's
Compensation Commission ordered the carrier to resume pay-
ment of temporary total disability benefits to Ms. Holland, and
the carrier complied.'
However, Ms. Holland brought an intentional tort action against
the carrier for its intentional refusal to pay workers' compensa-
tion benefits to her. She alleged that the carrier refused to make
the payments in an effort to force her into an inadequate settle-
ment of her claim, and that this constituted a breach of fiduciary
duties, a tortious breach of contract and the intentional infliction
of mental distress. The circuit court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss but granted his motion for an interlocutory appeal
to the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine the application of
the exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workmen's
Compensation Act to a Workers' Compensation insurance carrier.'
The supreme court affirmed the order of the circuit court over-
ruling the defendant's motion to dismiss and held that the exclu-
sive remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act does
not bar a claim by an employee against the employer's insurance
carrier for the commission of an intentional tort.'
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act was first enacted
in 1948.' The premise of the Act is a no-fault doctrine that relieves
the employer of liability for an injury to the employee arising out
of and in the course of his employment, regardless of the reason
I. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Holland, 469 So. 2d 55, 56 (Miss. 1984).
2. id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 59.
5. 1948 Miss. Laws ch. 354. § 1.
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and cause of the injury.' Before the Act was adopted the employee
had the common law remedy of bringing an action against his
employer for negligence. However, few claims were successful
because the employer had the defenses of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk and the fellow-servant rule, all of which barred
recovery.'
To give some form of relief to the injured employee and his
dependents, the legislatures adopted the quid pro quo of the
modem workers' compensation system:' the employee relinquishes
his common law actions against the employer in exchange for quick
economic relief regardless of the fault or negligence causing the
injury. The employee also receives any vocational rehabilitation
needed to restore him to the work force.' As for the employer,
he acquires limited liability and is protected against civil actions
by the exclusive remedy nature of the Act."0
The exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workmen's
Compensation Act not only applies to the employer as an individual
but also to an employer in the form of a partnership, association
or corporation." Officers or agents of a corporation who act with-
in the scope of their authority on behalf of the corporation are
also given the protection of the exclusive remedy provision. 2 Co-
employees are also protected.1
In determining the application of the exclusive remedy provi-
6. Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-7 (1972). Mississippi statutes restrict recovery from injuries to those that
are strictly work related. The applicable statute reads: "Compensation shall be payable for disability or death
of an employee from injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment, without
regard to fault as to the cause of the injury or occupational disease."
7. Compendium On Workmen's Compensation. The National Commission On State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws, 12 (N. Rosenblum ed. 1983).
8. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION § 65.11 (1983). Professor Larson states that
the quid pro quo is seen in the balancing of what is gained and relinquished by the employer and employee.
9. MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1 (1972).
10. MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-9 (1972), which states: "The liability of an employer to pay compensation
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee... and anyone otherwise
entitled to recover damages at common law or otherwise from such employer on account of such injury or
death .... .
11. Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-3(e) (1972 & Supp. 1985).
12. Brown v. Estess, 374 So. 2d 241, 243 (Miss. 1979).
13. Mississippi courts addressed the question of whether an employee who is injured by the negligent act
of a fellow employee can sue that negligent co-employee or whether he is limited to the benefits and coverage
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In Stubbs v. Green Brothers Gravel Co., Inc., 206 So. 2d 323 (Miss.
1968), the court stated that the injured employee's recovery was limited to the benefits provided by the Work-
men's Compensation Act. In another case dealing with this question, McCluskey v. Thompson, 363 So. 2d
256 (Miss. 1978), the court reasoned that to do otherwise would permit the employer or his insurance carrier
to shift the burden of compensation benefits to the fellow employee and not on the intended employing indus-
try. The legislature implemented the concept of enterprise liability to place the cost of the no-fault compensa-
tion system upon the industries employing the workers because, "(I) industrial injuries are causally related
to the fact of employment, and (2) the employer is in a position to pass this cost to society in the form of
higher prices." Id. at 259. By examining the total language of the statute and not just segments thereof, the
court concluded that it was the intent of the legislature not to allow an employer to recover compensation benefits
paid by him from a co-employee of the injured employee, and, therefore, the co-employee is included within
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. Id.
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sion to an insurance carrier, Mississippi and other jurisdictions
use different provisions of their Acts in deciding whether or not
to impose liability on the carrier for some alleged tort committed
against the claimant. The type of tort allegedly committed, be it
intentional or negligent, is also an important factor in this deter-
mination.
A considerable number of states are explicit in giving immunity
to the insurance carrier along with the employer.1" Other states
blend language in their Acts to imply a close relationship between
"employer" and "carrier.""5 In Arkansas' third party liability pro-
vision, 6 the phrase "employer or carrier" is followed closely by
"any third party," thus distinguishing the former from the latter
and giving immunity to the carrier. 7 Although Mississippi's stat-
utes are similar to those of Arkansas, Mississippi courts have
interpreted those similar provisions differently. In Stacy v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company18 the court analyzed the Act's pro-
visions by equating the carrier with the employer. 9 However, the
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(4)(1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301 (10) (1974 and Supp. 1984);
FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1 (1982 and Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-1
(1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (1967 and Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-5 (Bums 1974
and Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 2(6) (1964); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.131 (West
1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.030.2 (Vernon 1965 and Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-111 (1984);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:2 (1977); Ot. REV. STAT. § 656-018(3) (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §
501 (Purdon 1952 and Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-1-2 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102
(C)(3) (1983 and Supp. 1985); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon 1967); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 601(3) (1978); VA. CODE § 65-1-3 (1980).
15. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 (1976).
16. Id.
17. Home v. Security Mutual Casualty Co., 265 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
18. 334 F. Supp. 1216 (N.D. Miss. 1971). The plaintiff alleged that the exclusive remedy provision did
not bar his right to bring a common law action in tort against the insurance carrier for its negligent failure
to adequately inspect the work premises which resulted in an injury to the claimant.
19. The pertinent statutes involved in this litigation were Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-71, dealing with third
party liability; § 71-3-9, the exclusive remedy provision; and § 71-3-3, which contains definitions. Section
71-3-71 provides in part:
The acceptance of compensation benefits from or the making of a claim for compensation against an
employer or insurer for the injury or death of an employee shall not affect the right of the employee
or his dependents to sue any other party at law for such injury or death ....
Section 71-3-9 provides in part: "The liability of an employer to pay compensation shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee ...and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages at common law or otherwise from such employer on account of such injury or death . . . ." Section
71-3-3 gives the definitions of "employer' and "carrier": " '[Elmployer,' except when otherwise expressly stated,
includes a person, partnership, association, or corporation and the legal representatives of a deceased employ-
er, or the receiver or trustee of a person, partnership, association or corporation .... '[C]arrier' means any person
authorized in accordance with the provisions of this chapter to insure under this chapter and includes self-
insurers." Aetna contended that the placement of the words "employer or insurer" together followed by "any
other party" meant that the insurer could not be "any other party," thereby equating them with the employer.
However, the court reasoned that the use of "employer or insurer" in certain statutes and the use of "employer"
alone in others indicated a legislative intent for a different result. The court stated that the common use of
"employer" and "carrier" in § 71-3-71 was clearly limited to matters of compensation benefits and nothing else.
In considering the definitions of the words "employer" and "carrier," the court stated that these terms were
separate and not interchangeable; had there been any other legislative intent, the definitions of these terms
would have so stated.
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court concluded by stating that "nowhere does the Mississippi Act
provide that Workmen's Compensation benefits shall be the ex-
clusive remedy against the employer's carrier.""0 In Fuller v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company21 the court held that "an injured
claimant is not deprived of his right to proceed in common law
against the compensation carrier for the carrier's alleged negli-
gence in failing to properly inspect the employer's premises,
despite the immunity of the employer under workmen's compen-
sation.""
Although these cases involved a negligent act or omission by
the carrier, they represent the view in Mississippi that certain tor-
tious conduct by the carrier will give rise to a cause of action
against it as a third party. However, in determining liability, a
distinction must be made between negligent acts and intentional
ones.
Under Stacy and Fuller, the courts recognized the insurer as
a third party and did not bar an action against it for its negligent
failure to inspect the employer's work premises. However, the
Mississippi Supreme Court has obviated the grounds upon which
an action can be brought against the insurer based on negligence,
an unintentional tort. In Taylor v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company23 the court barred an action against the com-
pensation carrier for its alleged bad faith and malicious refusal
to pay compensation benefits. Although the plaintiffs pleadings
did not explicitly allege an intentional tort, there appears to be
some language implying both intentional and negligent actions on
the part of the carrier.24 The Taylor court used analagous third
party situations to reach its conclusion barring the action against
the carrier. Citing McCluskey v. Thompson,"5 the court stated that
one employee cannot bring a negligence action against a co-
employee because the injured employee's exclusive remedy is
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 6 The court also noted
a prior decision that held that a suit was barred by the exclusivity
provision where the employee alleged that the doctor, selected
by the employer to provide medical services for injured employees,
20. 334 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
21. 369 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Miss. 1974).
22. Id. at 968.
23. 420 So. 2d 564 (Miss. 1982).
24. Id. at 564. The declaration in Taylor alleged that the carrier "negligently, carelessly, wrecklessly [sic],
willfully and hazardiously [sic], failed, refused and neglected to process legitimate medical claims." The words
"willfully" and "refused" can be construed as implying intentional conduct.
25. 363 So. 2d 256 (Miss. 1978).
26. Id. at 264.
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had negligently aggravated a pre-existing compensable injury.27
The decision in Brown v. Estess,"8 which held that an action by
the employee based on negligent conduct by an officer of the cor-
poration was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act, was
also used by the Taylor court to show the distinction between negli-
gent and intentional conduct by third parties.
As can be seen by these cases, the court has extended the im-
munity given to the employer under the Act's exclusivity provi-
sion to include certain third parties when the action against them
is based on negligence. However, a different rule is used when
the action is based on some intentional tort.
The distinction between actions based upon intentional torts and
those based upon negligence was set forth in McCluskey. The
McClusky court stated, "Our Act and the common law right to
sue a fellow employee for negligence, as opposed to an inten-
tional tort, cannot coexist, so the common law right to sue a fellow
employee where the injured employee is covered by the Act must
give way." 2"
The Mississippi Supreme Court discussed this concept in Miller
v. McRae', Inc.3 ° In Miller the co-employee brought an action
against her employer for false imprisonment by a co-employee,
alleging that as a result thereof, she suffered great humiliation,
loss of reputation and physical illness."' In determining whether
the exclusive remedy provision of the Act was applicable in such
cases, the court stated that two questions must be decided: 1) Did
the injury arise out of and in the course of employment? and 2)
Is the injury compensable under the Workmen's Compensation
Act? 2 In resolving the question of compensability, the court
directed its attention to the definition of "injury" under the Act."
In so doing, the court stated that false imprisonment is obviously
not an accidental act but rather a willful one.' The next step by
the court was to define the term "third party," used in the "injury"
provision, as being either a stranger to the employer-employee
relationship or a co-employee acting outside the scope and course
27. Trotter v. Litton Systems, Inc., 370 So. 2d 244 (Miss. 1979).
28. 374 So. 2d 241 (Miss. 1979).
29. 363 So. 2d at 264.
30. 444 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1984).
31. !d. at 369.
32. Id. at 372.
33. Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-3-3 provides:
(b) 'Injury' means accidental injury or accidental death arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment, and includes injuries to artificial members, and also includes an injury caused by the willful
act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment while so employed
and working on the job . ...
34. 444 So. 2d at 370.
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of his employment." However, when an employee is injured by
a willful act of a fellow employee who is acting within the scope
of his employment, the injured employee is not precluded from
seeking a remedy outside the Workmen's Compensation Act. 6
The Miller court distinguished Brown by saying that in Brown
the allegations were based on negligence and not on a willful or
malicious act. 7 The court in Miller also distinguished Taylor by
stating, "[I]n Taylor the plaintiff was merely seeking compensa-
tion due him under the Act. As the Act provides a specific penalty
for bad faith refusal to pay, the Act was the exclusive remedy
available to Taylor." 8 Jurisdictions have reached differing results
when addressing the question of whether an action by an injured
worker against the compensation carrier based on an intentional
refusal to pay is barred by the exclusivity provision or some other
provision.
Perhaps the leading case in this area of workmen's compensa-
tion law is Stafford v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company. 39 In
this case, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that although the em-
ployer is given immunity under the exclusivity provision, the in-
surer is not."° The court explained that when the insurer committed
an intentional tort against the claimant, it ceased being the "alter
ego" of the employer and became instead a separate entity against
which a civil action for damages could be brought. 1 Pointing out
that the penalty provisions in the Act only applied to negligent
delay in payments, the court stated that when the insurer com-
mits "tortious conduct that goes beyond the bounds of untimely
payments, the immunity from suit provided by the Workmen's
Compensation Act is lost." 2
In Martin v. Travelers Insurance Company the court stated that
the exclusivity provision does not extend to the insurer when it
willfully stopped payments to the claimant. The court held that
not only was the exclusivity provision inapplicable, but the in-
jury alleged was not compensable under the Act. 3 It further stipu-
lated that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of
employment but was "incurred in the course of arising out of plain-




39. 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other grounds, Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 556 P.2d 525
(Alaska 1976).
40. 526 P.2d at 42.
41. Id. at 43.
42. Id.
43. 497 F.2d 329 (Ist Cir. 1974).
[VOL. 5:201
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION
tiffs status as a claimant seeking compensation, after his status
as an employee had terminated."" Therefore, the employee was
not barred from bringing an intentional tort action against the car-
rier outside the workmen's compensation statute.
Several courts have used the exclusivity provision to bar this
type of action including the decision in Escobedo v. American
Employers Insurance Company," which stated that the plaintiffs
separate action for bad faith refusal to pay claims was insepara-
ble from the original claims for compensation. The court explained
that whether the insurer acted in good faith or bad, the plaintiffs
only remedy was that stipulated in the Workmen's Compensation
Act. 6 Claims against the insurer based on intentional or negli-
gent refusal to pay benefits were barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Act in Sandoval v. Salt River Project.7 The court
further stated that "where the essence of the claim is the alleged
wrongful deprivation of benefits, the . ..Commission has the
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate that controversy.""8
Several other jurisdictions follow the decisions in these cases
and bar an action by the injured worker against the carrier based
upon the insurer's intentional failure to pay compensation benefits
because of the exclusive remedy provisions available under Work-
men's Compensation Acts. 9
Another theory that courts have adopted as a basis for granting
or denying independent actions against insurers is the penalty pro-
visions placed in the compensation acts for non-payment of com-
pensation benefits. Several courts deny a separate action when
the alleged injury is based upon mere negligent failure to pay com-
pensation claims.s However, when the activity exceeds mere
negligence, some courts will not limit the remedy to the Act but
will grant an action at common law."1 The courts reasoned that
44. Id. at 330, 331. See also Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978); Hayes
v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1980) (The Hayes opinion also stated that when the alleged
injury is incurred after the employment relationship is terminated, "the insurance carrier is no longer the 'alter
ego' of the employer, but rather is involved in an independent relationship to the employee when committing
such tortious acts." Id. at 261); Coleman v. American University Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220
(1970).
45. 547 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 545.
47. 117 Ariz. 209, 571 P.2d 706 (Ariz. App. 1977).
48. Id. at 215, 571 P.2d at 712.
49. See, e.g., Depew v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 135 Cal. App. 3d 574, 185 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1982);
Physicans & Surgeons Hospital, Inc., v. Leone, 399 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 1981); Young v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 588 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1979); Dickson v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co.,
98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1 (1982).
50. See, e.g., Stafford v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 526 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), overruled on other
grounds, Cooper v. Argonaut Insurance Co., 556 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1976); Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters,
609 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1980).
51. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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the penalty statutes were only intended to deter untimely or negli-
gent payments and were not legislated to operate as the exclusive
remedy for all intentional torts.
5 2
INSTANT CASE
In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Hol-
land,"3 the court addressed the issue of whether a worker who
has sustained an injury compensable under the Mississippi Work-
men's Compensation Act may maintain a separate action against
the insurance carrier for the commission of an intentional tort in
the processing of the worker's claim." The court stated that the
exclusivity provision which is often used to bar such actions against
third parties does not apply to the carrier when that carrier com-
mits an intentional tort against the claimant.55 The court's ration-
ale is based upon two grounds. First, when the insurance carrier
committed such intentional torts it was acting outside its "alter
ego" relationship shared with the employer and is therefore not
given the immunity of the employer. 6 The actions of the insurer
are a part of an independent relationship with the employee and
do not arise out of the claimant's employment status.
5 7
Secondly, penalty provisions provided by some compensation
acts are only intended to deter negligent delay in payments and
are not legislated as exclusive remedies for all intentional acts
committed by "an overreaching insurance company against a week-
ly wage earner." 8 The court concluded by stating that "to extend
immunity to compensation carriers for a separate injury to workers
goes far beyond the intent of the Act." 59
However, Justice Walker in his dissenting opinion stated that
the present case is indistinguishable from Taylor, and therefore
the penalty provision of the Act should have been the exclusive
remedy available to the claimant."'
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The court in Southern Farm begins its opinion by distinguishing
the prior case of Taylor. The distinction made between the two
cases is based upon the type of allegations made by the claimant
52. Id.
53. 469 So. 2d 55 (Miss. 1984).
54. Id. at 56.
55. Id. at 59.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 59.
60. Id. (Walker, J., dissenting).
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against the carrier. In Taylor, the employee alleged the injury of
"emotional stress" due to the carrier's "negligent" and "willful"
refusal to pay medical claims. 1 In Southern Farm, the plaintiff
alleged "intentional infliction of mental distress" based upon the
carrier's refusal to pay compensation benefits. The distinction made
by the court between the two allegations is that in Taylor the alle-
gations sound in negligence and in Southern Farm plaintiffs alle-
gations derive from an intentional tort. However, as seen by the
pleadings of Taylor, there is also language present that sounds
of an intentional tort. " To distinguish between negligent and in-
tentional acts in barring an action is justifiable based upon the
law in prior cases," but to make this distinction based upon the
pleadings in these cases is unwarranted. In doing so the court glori-
fies form over substance and allows an employee to bring a
separate action against the carrier based purely on the language
of the pleadings. A claimant would be successful in changing an
unactionable delay in payments claim into an actionable inten-
tional tort by simply using the words "intentional infliction of men-
tal distress" instead of "emotional distress" due to the carrier's
"negligent" and "willful" refusal to pay medical claims. Surely
this is contrary to the intent of the legislature in its enactment of
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
If the court's attempt to distinguish the cases of Southern Farm
and Taylor based upon their pleadings is disregarded, it appears
that barring a claim for a negligent act and allowing the action
when it is grounded on an intentional tort is well reasoned. As
noted in the discussion of Miller,6" the courts have recognized the
necessity of allowing separate actions when the alleged injury is
committed by the intentional act of co-employees. However, when
the injury is based upon the negligence of a co-employee, the ac-
tion is barred." By applying these standards to the third party car-
rier, we find that mere negligence in making payments is covered
by the Act," while an intentional refusal to pay provides an alter-
nate ground for recovery. 7 The result in Southern Farm can also
be supported by considering the "injury" definition in the Work-
men's Compensation Act as exclusive of injuries caused by the
willful act of a third person when that act is not directed against
the employee because of his employment while so employed and
61. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
62. Id.
63. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 13.
66. 420 So. 2d at 566.
67. 469 So. 2d at 58.
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working on the job."8 Other jurisdictions follow this analysis and
allow separate actions when the injury is based upon an inten-
tional, not negligent act of the carrier. ' These courts recognize
that the carriers' intentional refusal to pay a claim and the possi-
ble subsequent infliction of emotional stress arise from a separate
and independent relationship with the employee as a compensa-
tion claimant and not from the original employment status. 70 The
court in Southern Farm takes this logical approach by stating that
when the insurance carrier commits an intentional tort against the
employee, the carrier ceases being the "alter ego" of the employ-
er. 7 "Rather, the carrier is involved in an independent relation-
ship with the employee when committing such tortious acts." 72
The court's second reason for granting a common law action
involves the inadequacy of the Act's penalty provision. Although
the Act's penalty provision provides for ten percent and twenty
percent of the amount owed as penalties for failure to pay an in-
stallment of compensation due, the court believes that this is ade-
quate only when the failure is due to the carrier's negligence and
it is totally inadequate in deterring intentional wrongdoings by
the carrier. With this interpretation the court again follows the
majority of jurisdictions.74
In analyzing the court's holding and rationale, one can conclude
that the court used the principles and theories set forth in their
prior cases and those stipulated in the majority of other jurisdic-
tions addressing similar actions. However, the court's position
in distinguishing between the pleadings of Taylor and the plead-
ings in Southern Farm is questionable. As noted earlier, 7 both
of the allegations involved include similar language and are based
on the same type of actions and allege the same form of injuries.
Nevertheless, the court is determined to find negligence in the
former, thus barring it, and to find an intentional tort in the latter,
therefore allowing the action. Indeed, no one disputes the neces-
sity for precise, succinct and explicit language in the pleading,
and the barring of actions for failing to state a proper claim, but
it is questionable that this is the court's motivation. The court is
making a distinction, and justifiably so, between actions of this
nature based upon negligent conduct and those based upon an in-
68. See supra note 33.
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
70. Id.
71. 469 So. 2d at 58.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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tentional tort. The problem that arises is how an attorney or trial
judge who has read the opinions in Taylor and Southern Farm
can correctly discern whether the damages of any specific case
are limited to the provisions of the Mississippi Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.' 6 The possibility exists that any employee who wants
to bring a separate action against the compensation carrier for
failure to make benefit payments on time need only to disguise
his action in terms of "intentional infliction of emotional stress."
The temptation to abuse such actions is all too obvious. However,
the court points out that the question is one of statutory construc-
tion, and the failure of the state legislature to provide a more ex-
plicit exclusive remedy provision places the burden on the court
as to the extent to which the exclusive remedy will be carried.
The question still remains: How far will the provision be limited
or extended?
Philip M. Reeves
76. 469 So. 2d at 61 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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